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Abstract
We consider the problem of implementing a security protocol in such a manner that secrecy
of sensitive data is not jeopardized. Implementation is assumed to take place in the context of
an API that provides standard cryptography and communication services. Given a dependency
speci6cation, stating how API methods can produce and consume secret information, we pro-
pose an information 8ow property based on the idea of invariance under perturbation, relating
observable changes in output to corresponding changes in input. Besides the information 8ow
condition itself, the main contributions of the paper are results relating the admissibility prop-
erty to a direct 8ow property in the special case of programs which branch on secrets only in
cases permitted by the dependency rules. These results are used to derive an unwinding theorem,
reducing a behavioural correctness check (strong bisimulation) to an invariant.
c© 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
We consider the problem of securely implementing a security protocol given an API
providing standard services for cryptography, communication, key- and bu=er man-
agement. In particular, we are interested in the problem of con6dentiality, that is, to
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show that a given protocol implementation which uses standard features for encryption,
random number generation, input–output, etc. does not leak con6dential information
provided to it, either because of malicious intent, or because of bugs.
Both problems are real. Malicious implementations (Trojans) can leak intercepted
information using anything from simple direct transmission to, e.g. subliminal channels,
power, or timing channels. Bugs can arise because of 6eld values that are wrongly
constructed, mistaken representations, nonces that are reused or generated in predictable
ways, or misused random number generators, to give just a few examples.
Our work starts from the assumption that the protocol and the API are known. The
task, then, is to ensure that con6dential data is used at the correct times and in the cor-
rect way by API methods. The constraints must necessarily be quite rigid and detailed.
For instance, a non-constant time API method which is made freely available to be ap-
plied to data containing secrets can immediately be used in conjunction with otherwise
legitimate output to create a timing leak, even without data-dependent branching.
Our approach is to formulate a dependency speci1cation, a set of rules that deter-
mines the required dependencies between those API method calls that produce and=or
consume secrets. An example of such a dependency rule might be
send(v; OUT )← k keyBOB; m get IN; v enc(m; k)
indicating that, if upon its last invocation of the get method with argument IN the
protocol received m (and analogously for key, BOB, and k), then the next invocation
of send with second parameter OUT must, as its 6rst parameter, receive the encryption
of m with key k.
A dependency speci6cation de6nes an information 8ow property by characterizing the
set of allowed 8ows. For example, the rule above allows the 8ow of the secret plaintext
m to public channel OUT only if m is 6rst encrypted using BOB’s key. Assurance,
then, must be given that no other 8ows involving secrets exist. Our approach to this is
based on the notion of admissibility, introduced 6rst in [4]. The idea is to extract from
the dependency speci6cation a set of system perturbation functions g which will allow
a system s processing a secret v to act as if it is actually processing another value of
that secret, v′. Then, con6dentiality is tantamount to showing that system behaviour is
invariant under perturbation, i.e. that
s[g] ∼ s;
where [g] is the system perturbation operator. One problem is that, provided this is
licensed by the dependency rules, secrets actually become visible at the external in-
terface. For this reason, the perturbation operator [g] must be able to identify the
appropriate cases where this applies, so that internal changes in the choice of secret
can be undone.
It is worth pointing out that the approach presented here, like any semantics-based
characterization of information 8ow, can only deal with 8ows that are observable within
the semantic model. Covert channels may exist that exploit the unavoidable gap between
model and reality. For example, probabilistic and timing covert channels may run
on undetected if probabilistic, resp. timing, aspects are not modelled. Even when the
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examples in this paper assume a possibilistic and untimed semantic model, this is not
a prerequisite of the approach. The idea of invariance under perturbation is parametric
in, precisely, the de6nition of invariance (i.e. ∼).
The paper has two main contributions. First, we show how the idea can be real-
ized in the context of a simple sequential imperative language, IMP. Secondly we
establish results which provide e>cient (thought not yet fully automated) veri6cation
techniques, and give credence to the claim that admissibility is a good formalisation
of con6dentiality in this context. In particular, we show that, for the special case of
programs which branch on secrets only in cases permitted by the dependency rules,
admissibility can be reduced to a direct 8ow property (an invariant) which we call
8ow compatibility. Vice versa, we show that under some additional assumptions, 8ow
compatibility can be reduced to admissibility.
This work clearly has strong links to previous work in the area of information 8ow
theory and language-based security (cf. [10]). The idea of invariance under perturbation
and logical relations underpins most work on secrecy and information 8ow theory (see
[1]), though not always very explicitly (cf. [3,5,13,11]). The main point, in contrast
e.g. to work by Volpano [12], is that we make no attempt to address information 8ow
of a cryptographic program in absolute terms, but are satis6ed with controlling the use
of cryptographic primitives according to some external protocol speci6cation. This is
obviously a much weaker analysis, but at the same time it re8ects well, we believe,
the situation faced by the practical protocol implementor.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present IMP and
introduce the main example used in the paper, a declassi6er which will leak a secret
provided it has been authorized to do so by some external agent. In Section 3, we
introduce an annotated semantics, used in Section 4 to formalise the dependency rules.
The notion of 8ow compatibility is presented in Section 5 to describe the direct infor-
mation 8ow required by a protocol speci6cation. In Section 6, the main information
8ow condition, admissibility, is introduced. In Section 7, we state and prove the un-
winding theorem, while in Section 8 we further investigate the relation between 8ow
compatibility and admissibility. Finally Section 9 concludes with discussion and related
work.
2. A sequential imperative language
In this section we introduce IMP, the language we use for protocol implementation.
The intention is to formalise the basic functionality of simple protocol implementations
in as uncontroversial a manner as possible.
Fig. 1 de6nes the syntax of IMP, with variables x∈Var, including the anonymous
variable , primitive function and procedure calls, and primitive data types including
natural numbers (n∈Nat) and channels (a∈Chan). The set of primitive function sym-
bols, ranged over by pf, includes the standard arithmetic and logical operators as well
as tuple projectors (i). Each primitive function pf :Val→Val is assumed to satisfy
pf (xcpt)= xcpt (i.e. primitive function invocations propagate exceptions from argu-
ments to results). Moreover, primitive functions are assumed to execute in constant
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Basic values (BVal) b ::= n | a | true | (b1; : : : ; bn)
Values (Val) v ::= b | xcpt
Functions (Fun) f ::= pf | h
Expressions (Expr) e ::= v | x | (e1; : : : ; en) | f e
Commands (Com) c ::= ∗ | skip | throw | x := e | c0; c1 |
if e then c0 else c1 |
while e do c end | try c0 catch c1
Fig. 1. IMP syntax.
time, regardless of their arguments, and to have no side e=ects. Communication e=ects
are brought out using transition labels in the next section. There are also non-primitive
(or API) functions, ranged over by h, for (non-deterministic and non-malleable) en-
cryption (enc), decryption (dec), extracting a key from a keystore (key), and receiving
resp. sending a value on a channel (get and send). Considering the commands of the
language, ∗ represents the empty command that is used only to ease the presentation
of the semantics. It is assumed that ∗ satis6es the following structural congruences:
∗; c≡ c; ∗≡ c and try ∗ catch c≡∗. Observe that, while skip can be executed in one
step, ∗ is not to be executed at all. While exceptions do not enhance in any funda-
mental way the expressiveness of the language, a simple exception mechanism helps
approximate the way cryptographic protocols are coded in real-life imperative pro-
gramming languages. Furthermore, the possibility of exceptions introduces unobvious
control branching points which, in turn, may induce implicit information 8ows.
As a running example we use a simple declassi6er, representative of applications
which are required to input a collection of data, some sensitive, some not, perform
some cryptographic operations on the data, and occasionally transmit the results on a
public channel.
2.1. A declassi1cation protocol
This protocol involves three agents, a client (C), a declassi6er (DCL), and the
public (PUBLIC). The client is interested in declassifying a secret to the public, but
this needs the approval of the declassi6er. Following the protocol, the client sends
the secret to the declassi6er for consideration; the declassi6er examines it and decides
whether to approve or not the request. The declassi6er’s response, decl, is sent back
to the client together with the secret. The client can then communicate the secret to
the public only if the response was a>rmative (i.e. decl=YES). A description of the
protocol using the standard (and informal) notation appears in Fig. 2.
According to the protocol, all communication between the client and the declassi6er
is to be encrypted using a key, KC;D shared between the client and the declassi6er. It
is also assumed that the secret contains enough information so that the declassi6er can
identify it properly.
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Message 1 C → DCL : {secret}KC; D
Message 2 DCL → C : {decl; secret}KC; D
Message 3 C → PUBLIC : secret if decl = YES
Fig. 2. A declassi6cation protocol.
1: key := key DCL ;
2: while true do
3: secret := get SECRET ;
4: outPacket := enc(secret, key);
5: := send(outPacket, DCL) ;
6: encResp := get DCL ;
7: try
8: resp := dec(encResp, key) ;
9: if 1(resp) = YES and 2(resp) = secret
10: then := send(secret, PUBLIC)
11: else skip
12: catch skip
13: end
Fig. 3. Client—sample implementation.
Fig. 3 shows what a simple implementation of the Client’s side of the declassi6cation
protocol might look like in IMP. Keywords in uppercase letters denote constant vari-
ables, e.g. SECRET identi6es the channel that provides the secret data to the client. In
general, an implementation needs to deal with a lot more issues than what are explic-
itly addressed at the protocol speci6cation level. These include: initialisation and use
of cryptographic services, where and how data is stored and addressed, communication
services, and error handling. Further, in some applications the protocol implementation
may well be bundled with the user interface, in which case a further set of issues arise.
It may be instructive to also show some of the means available to implementations
wishing to violate con6dentiality. For instance, a hostile implementation might “forget”
to fully verify the Declassi6er’s response by replacing line 9 of Fig. 3 with
9: if 2(resp) = secret then:
Essentially, this would declassify the secret even when the Declassi6er may explicitly
forbid the operation. The implementation might also try to replace good keys by bad
ones, for instance by replacing line 1 with
1: key := key ATTACKER:
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In the following example, the execution of line 8.2 may look innocuous by itself, but in
the context of the conditional statement it creates an indirect leak of secret information:
8:1: if secret=FIXEDVAL then
8:2: := send(DUMMY;PUBLIC)
8:3: else skip;
There are many other simple ways of building covert channels, such as timing channels,
for instance by introducing data-dependent delays, either explicitly, or by exploiting
timing properties of library functions.
3. Annotated semantics
The 6rst challenge is to identify the direct 8ows and computations on secret and
critical data (an example of the latter is a public key needed to encrypt a secret before
communication on a public channel. Since a malicious implementation could simply
use a di=erent key for encryption, it is also necessary to track its origins). Once this is
accomplished, other techniques based on non-interference are brought to bear to handle
the indirect 8ows. The direct 8ows are tracked using annotations. In particular, we need
to identify:
(1) The operations that cause critical values to enter the system (such as execution of
get a for some given value of a).
(2) The operations that are applied to secrets, once they have been input.
To account for this we provide IMP with an annotated semantics. Annotations are
intended to reveal how a value has been computed, from its point of entry into the
system. For instance, the annotated value
347 : enc(717 : get a; 101 : key 533)
is intended to indicate that the value 347 was computed by applying the API func-
tion enc to the pair (717; 101) for which the left hand component was computed by
evaluating get a, and so on.
Annotated expressions and values are obtained by changing the de6nition of expres-
sions (resp. values) in Fig. 1:
Annotated basic values (aBVal) + ::= b | (+1; : : : ; +n) | b : ’;
Annotated values (aVal) w ::= + | xcpt | xcpt : ’;
Annotated expressions (aExp) . ::= w | x | (.1; : : : ; .n) |f .;
Annotations (Ann) ’ ::= fw:
Annotations are erased using the operation <w= which recursively removes annotations
in the obvious way.
P. Giambiagi, M. Dam / Science of Computer Programming 50 (2004) 73–99 79
Table 1
Annotated semantics, expressions
0  x 1−→ 0(x) 0  .
2−→ .′
0  (: : : ; .; : : :) 2−→ (: : : ; .′; : : :)
<w= = xcpt
0  (: : : ; w; : : :) 1−→w
0  . 2−→ .′
0 f . 2−→f .′
pf (<w=) = v
0  pf w 1−→ v : pf w
0  hw v hw−−−−−−→ v : hw
Table 1 de6nes the small-step semantics for expression evaluation. The transition
relation has the shape
0 
 . 2−→ .′;
where 2 is an action of the form 1 (internal computation step) or v hw (h is applied
to the annotated value w resulting in the value v), and 0 is an annotated store, a par-
tial function 0∈ aStore, [Var→ aBVal]. In particular, note that internal computation
corresponds either to evaluation of primitive function calls or to the propagation of
exceptions out of tuples.
Annotated values give only static information in the style “the value v′ was computed
by evaluating key(v : get a)”, but no information concerning which actual invocations
of the key and get functions were involved. However, our dependency speci1cations
(introduced on p. 2 and formalised by De6nition 3) require that we can identify value
annotations that correspond to last invocations. For that purpose we introduce a notion
of context to record the last value returned by some given annotated function call (i.e.
annotation).
De nition 1 (Context). A context is a partial function s : [Ann→Val].
So, if s is a context then s’ is the last value returned by the annotated function call
’. Observe that it is the semantics of the dependency speci1cation what determines
the contextual (or historical) information that should be collected. Richer speci6cation
languages than the one used in this paper could certainly require more contextual
information (e.g. the result of all function invocations, their relative order or even the
moment in time in which each event took place).
Contexts form part of program con6gurations in the annotated semantics:
De nition 2 (Annotated con6guration). An annotated con1guration is a triple
〈c; 0; s〉 where c is a command, 0∈ aStore and s∈Context. We use 〈0; s〉 as abbre-
viation of 〈∗; 0; s〉.
The annotated command-level semantics is shown in Table 2. We use 0[+=x] to
denote store update (i.e. 0[+=x](x)= + and 0[+=x](y)= 0(y) for y = x). The same
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Table 2
Small-step semantics for annotated commands
 〈skip; 0; s〉 1−→〈0; s〉  〈x := +; 0; s〉 1−→〈0[+=x]; s〉
 〈c0; 0; s〉
2−→〈c′0; 0′; s′〉
 〈c0; c1; 0; s〉
2−→〈c′0; c1; 0′; s′〉
<+= = true
 〈if + then c0 else c1; 0; s〉
1−→〈c0; 0; s〉
<+= = true
 〈if + then c0 else c1; 0; s〉
1−→〈c1; 0; s〉
 〈while . do c end; 0; s〉 1−→〈if . then c;while . do c end else skip; 0; s〉
 〈c0; 0; s〉
2−→〈c′0; 0′; s′〉
 〈try c0 catch c1; 0; s〉
2−→〈try c′0 catch c1; 0′; s′〉
 〈try throw catch c1; 0; s〉
1−→〈c1; 0; s〉
0  . 1−→ .′
 〈r[.]; 0; s〉 1−→〈r[.′]; 0; s〉
0  . v hw−−−−−−→ .′
 〈r[.]; 0; s〉 v hw−−−−−−→〈r[.′]; 0; s[v=h w]〉
<w= = xcpt
 〈r[w]; 0; s〉 1−→〈throw; 0; s〉
notation is applied for context updates. To lift transitions between expressions to transi-
tions between con6gurations, we use reduction contexts r[·] ::= x := · | if · then c0 else c1.
4. Dependency rules
Our approach to con6dentiality is to ensure that the direct 8ows of information
follow the protocol speci6cation, and then use information 8ow analysis to protect
against indirect 8ows. In this section, we introduce dependency rules to formalise the
permitted, direct 8ows.
De nition 3 (Dependency speci6cation). A dependency speci1cation is a pair P= 〈H;
A〉 where H⊆Ann is a set of annotations of the form hw, and A is a 6nite set of
rules of the form
h e← x1 h1 e1; : : : ; xn hn en when  ; (1)
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eval(w) = <w=
eval( 1; : : : ;  n) =
{
(eval( 1); : : : ; eval( n)) if ∀i: eval( i) = xcpt
xcpt otherwise
eval(pf  ) = pf(eval( ))
eval( 1≡  2) = (eval( 1) = eval( 2))
Fig. 4. Evaluation of boolean conditions in dependency rules.
where none of the expressions e, e1; : : : ; en mention functions or exceptions, variables
in ei do not belong to {xi; : : : ; xn}, and  is a boolean condition with free variables in
{x1; : : : xn} and syntax given by
Boolean conditions (4)  ::= w | x | ( 1; : : : ;  n) |pf  |  1≡  2 :
The intention is thatH represents a set of secret entry points (such as: get SECRET ),
and that the rules in A determine a bound to the secret data 8ows that are allowed in
an implementation.
A rule in the speci6cation declares an API function invocation h e to be admissible
if the conditions to the right of the arrow are satis6ed. Informally, conditions of the
form xi hi ei are satis6ed if variable xi matches the last value returned by hi ei.
Restricting attention to last invocations helps keep speci6cation rules simple, a decision
motivated by the fact that most cryptographic protocol sessions involve a reduced
number of (mostly distinct) API invocations. More importantly, notice that dependency
speci6cations cannot allow=reject 8ows on the basis of temporal constraints such as the
order of function calls.
The boolean expression  represents an extra condition that relates the values re-
turned by the di=erent API function invocations, and that may be evaluated using
function eval :4→Val (see Fig. 4). Recall that primitive functions pf include the
standard arithmetic and logical operators. Moreover, since pf is required to preserve
exceptions we obtain that xcpt≡ xcpt evaluates to true, but xcpt= xcpt evaluates to
xcpt.
To formalise the semantics of a dependency speci6cation, we need one more de6ni-
tion. Let a context s be given. A valid substitution for rule (1) is an annotated store
6∈ aStore such that
(1) 6(xi)= s(hi (ei6)) : hi (ei6) for all i : 16i6n,
(2) if x does not appear in xi hi ei (∀i: 16i6n), then 6(x) has no annotation in H,
(3) eval( 6)= true.
That is, the value bound to xi by 6 should be equal to the last value returned by the
annotated function call hi (ei6); all variables that are not thus determined by the context
s must not have secret annotations; and the boolean condition should be satis6ed. By
e6 we mean the annotated ground expression (aExpr) that results from substituting
6(x) for every variable x in e. It is easy to check that the restrictions on e (resp. ei) in
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De6nition 3 guarantee that e6 (resp. ei6) is an annotated (basic) value. Notation: When
eval( 6)= true regardless of the substitution 6, we usually drop  and the preceding
keyword when from the dependency rule (1).
We can now determine whether a particular function invocation is admitted by the
dependency speci6cation.
De nition 4 (Admissible invocation). Let 2 be an annotated action of the form v hw.
A dependency speci6cation P= 〈H;A〉 admits annotated action 2 in context s i= ei-
ther:
(1) no annotation in w belongs to H (that is, the actual parameters do not directly
depend on any secret), or
(2) there is a rule h e← x1 h1 e1; : : : ; xn hn en when  in A and a valid
substitution 6 for this rule such that e6=w.
If any one of these conditions is satis6ed we write P; s 
 2 ok.
Observe that the concept of admissible action covers both those actions whose execu-
tion is required by the protocol speci6cation, as well as those that do not (explicitly)
involve any sensitive data. In particular, internal 1 transitions are always admissible
(i.e. P; s 
 1 ok). Note as well that the de6nition of P; s 
 v hw ok is independent
of the value of v.
Example 5 (Dependency speci6cation for the declassi6er’s client). For the declassi6-
cation protocol, the only pieces of information that the Client should protect are the
secret itself (obtained through channel SECRET, and all the keys it shares with other
principals). Therefore, H= {get SECRET}∪ {key w |w∈ aVal}, and A consists of
rules for encryption, for decryption, for sending encrypted packets to the declassi6er,
and for declassifying the secret.
enc(s; k)← s get SECRET; k key DCL (2)
send(o; DCL)← o enc x (3)
dec(m; k)← m get DCL; k key DCL (4)
send(s; PUBLIC) ← s get SECRET; r dec(m; k)
when 1(r) = YES ∧ 2(r) = s: (5)
According to rule (2), each time the encryption function (enc) is invoked with some
sensitive parameter (i.e. a value with an annotation in H), it must be the case that the
plaintext is the secret which was received last (by means of function get), and that
the encryption key is the Declassi6er’s. By rule (3) all sensitive information sent to the
Declassi6er must be encrypted. There is no need to further restrict the argument (i.e.
x) passed to enc, for that is already constrained by rule (2). Since key DCL∈H, rule
(4) is needed to admit the decryption operation implicit in the processing of Message
P. Giambiagi, M. Dam / Science of Computer Programming 50 (2004) 73–99 83
2 (cf. Fig. 2). Finally, by rule (5) a secret may be declassi6ed provided the decrypted
message both says so and correctly matches the current secret.
As the example shows, dependency speci6cations are very low-level objects. They
are not really meant as external speci6cations of con6dentiality requirements, but rather
as intermediate representations of 8ow requirements, generated from some more user-
friendly protocol speci6cation once a speci6c runtime platform has been chosen.
5. Flow compatibility
Dependency speci6cations determine, through De6nition 4, when a function invoca-
tion is admissible. In this section, we tie this to the transition semantics to obtain an
account of the direct information 8ow required by a dependency speci6cation.
Let the relation
〈c; 0; s〉 ⇒ 〈c′; 0′; s′〉
be the re8exive, transitive closure of the annotated transition relation, i.e. the smallest
relation such that 〈c; 0; s〉⇒ 〈c′; 0′; s′〉 holds i= either c= c′, 0= 0′ and s= s′ or else
c1; 01; s1 exist such that 〈c; 0; s〉⇒ 〈c1; 01; s1〉 and 〈c1; 01; s1〉 2−→〈c′; 0′; s′〉.
De nition 6. Let the dependency speci6cation P= 〈H;A〉 be given. The command
c∈Com is ;ow compatible with P for initial store 0 and initial context s, if whenever
〈c; 0; s〉⇒ 〈c1; 01; s1〉 2−→〈c2; 02; s2〉 then P; s1 
 2 ok.
Example 7 (Flow compatibility for the declassi6er’s client). The program of Fig. 3 is
8ow compatible with the Declassi6er’s Client dependency speci6cation of Example 5,
for any initial store 0. This is seen by proving that appropriate invariants hold each
time execution reaches one of the statements in lines 4, 5, 8 and 10. For example, at
line 10 the store 0 and context s can be shown to always satisfy, for suitable choices
of v1; : : : ; v4,
0(secret) = v1 : get SECRET; 0(key) = v2 : key DCL;
0(encResp) = v3 : get DCL; s(dec(0(encResp); 0(key)) = v4;
1(v4) = YES; 2(v5) = v1:
It is a simple matter to check P; s 
 send(v1 : get SECRET; PUBLIC) ok using rule (5)
in Example 5 and the following valid substitution 6:
6(s) = 0(secret); 6(k) = 0(key);
6(m) = 0(encResp); 6(r) = v4 : dec(6(m); 6(k)):
Consider now the three malicious implementations discussed by the end of Section 2.1.
In the 6rst two cases, 8ow compatibility is violated, as expected. On the other hand, the
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third malicious implementation is 8ow compatible, also as expected, since the indirect
leak will not be traced by the annotation regime.
6. Admissibility
If there is an admissible 8ow of information from some input, say get acc, to some
output, say, send(: : : ; enc((: : : ; acc); : : :); : : :) then by perturbing the input, corresponding
perturbations of the output should result, and only those. In this section we formalise
this idea.
In the context of multilevel security it is by now quite well understood how to model
absence of information 8ow (from a high security level—or clearance—to a lower one)
as invariance of system behaviour under perturbation of secret inputs (cf. [3,5,13,11],
see also [2] for application of similar ideas in the context of protocol analysis). For
instance, the intuition supporting Gorrieri and Focardi’s generalized non-interference
model is that there should be no observable di=erence (i.e. behaviour should be in-
variant) whether high-level inputs are blocked or allowed to proceed silently. So the
perturbation of high-level inputs, in this case, is whether or not they take place at all.
Here the situation is somewhat di=erent since the multilevel security model is not
directly applicable: There is no meaningful way to de6ne security levels re8ecting the
intended con6dentiality policy, not even in the presence of a trusted downgrader. On
the contrary, the task is to characterize the admissible 8ows from high to low level in
such a manner that no trust in the downgrader (i.e. the protocol implementation) will
be required.
The idea is to map a dependency speci6cation to a set of system perturbations.
Each such function is a permutation on actions and con6gurations which will make a
con6guration containing a secret, say x, appear to the external world as if it actually
contains another secret, say x′. If the behaviour of the original and the permuted
con6guration are the same, the external world will have no way of telling whether the
secret is x or x′.
At the core of any con6guration permutation there is a function permuting values
(e.g. x and x′). This leads to the following de6nition:
De nition 8 (Value permutation). A bijection g : aVal→ aVal is a value permutation
if it preserves the structure of annotated values:
(1) g(v)= v,
(2) g(+1; : : : ; +n)= (g(+1); : : : ; g(+n)),
(3) g(v :fw)= v′ :f g(w), for some suitable value v′ ;
and the meaning of primitive functions:
(4) v= pf (<w=) i= v′= pf (<w′=), given g(v : pf w)= v′ : pf w′.
We do not require the meaning of non-primitive functions to be preserved by value
permutations. Since we do not want to prescribe any particular behaviour for API
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implementations, our semantics does not actually assign a meaning to non-primitive
functions in the 6rst place, so formally there is nothing to preserve. This is so, since
API implementations in our framework are trusted: Dependency speci6cations simply
state under what conditions an API function may be invoked, regardless of how it is
actually implemented.
We extend value permutations over transition labels and contexts. In the 6rst case, let
g(1), 1 and g(v hw), v′ hw′, where g(v : hw)= v′ : hw′. For contexts, de6ne
g(s)(fw),<g(s(fw′) : fw′)= where w′ = g−1(w): (6)
The following lemma establishes the coherence of the above de6nitions. It states that
the relation between contexts s and g(s) is preserved after the execution of the API
function call hw, resp. h g(w).
Lemma 9. If g(v hw)= v′ hw′ then g(s[v=h w])= g(s)[v′=h w′].
Not all value permutations are interesting for our purposes. In fact, we are only
interested in those that permute secrets as dictated by a dependency speci6cation.
De nition 10 (Secret permuter). Assume given a dependency speci6cation P=(H;
A). A secret permuter for P is a value permutation g satisfying the following condi-
tions:
(1) if w does not contain annotations in H then g(w) = w,
(2) 6 is a valid substitution for rule r ∈A and context s if and only if 6′(x), g(6(x))
is a valid substitution for rule r and context g(s),
(3) g(xcpt : hw)= xcpt : h g(w), for every API function h.
As expected, a secret permuter a=ects only secret values. This is implied by the 6rst
condition in De6nition 10. Condition (10.2) implies that a secret permuter must respect
the restrictions imposed by the boolean conditions in each dependency rule. On the
other hand, we assume that the exceptional behaviour of an API function is always
observable. Thus, if the execution of hw raises an exception, we should not consider
those cases where h g(w) does not raise an exception. This is re8ected by condition
(10.3).
The following lemma and proposition further characterize the set of secret permuters
associated to a dependency speci6cation.
Lemma 11. Let g be a secret permuter. Then
(1) g−1(g(s)) = s,
(2) g−1 is a secret permuter, and
(3) if P; s 
 2 ok then P; g(s) 
 g(2) ok.
Proposition 12 (Composition of secret permuters). Given a dependency speci1cation,
the set of secret permuters is closed under functional composition.
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Example 13 (Secret permuter for the declassi6cation example). Here we give an ex-
ample of a secret permuter for the dependency speci6cation in Example 5. First we
verify that it is a value permutation (De6nition 8), and then that it is indeed a secret
permuter (De6nition 10).
Let g : aVal→ aVal exchange annotated values as follows:
v1 : get SECRET ↔ v′1 : get SECRET;
v2 : key DCL ↔ v′2 : key DCL;
v4 : dec(v3 : get DCL; v2 : key DCL)↔ v′4 : dec(v3 : get DCL; v′2 : key DCL);
v1 : 2(v4 : dec(v3 : get DCL; v2 : key DCL))↔
v′1 : 2(v
′
4 : dec(v3 : get DCL; v
′
2 : key DCL))
for some 6xed basic values vi and v′j satisfying vi = v′i , 1(v4)= 1(v′4)=YES, 2(v4)=
v1 and 2(v′4)= v
′
1. On all other values, g acts in accordance with conditions in De6ni-
tions 8 and 10. Conditions (8.1)–(8.4), (10.1) and (10.3) are easily validated. To verify
condition (10.2) consider rule (5) in the dependency speci6cation of the Declassi6er’s
Client (Example 5). Given a context s such that
s(get SECRET ) = v1; s(dec(v3 : get DCL; v2 : key DCL)) = v4;
s(key DCL) = v2
assume 6 is a valid substitution for s and the mentioned rule. Let 6′(x), g(6(x)). We
need to show that 6′ satis6es conditions (1)–(3) in the de6nition of valid substitution
within context g(s). Condition (2) holds trivially. Let us illustrate the veri6cation of
condition (1) with variable s in rule (5).
6′(s) = g(6(s)) = g(s(get SECRET ) : get SECRET )
= g(v1 : get SECRET ) = <g(v1 : get SECRET )= : get SECRET
= g(s)(get SECRET ) : get SECRET:
Note that <6′(s)= = v′1. In the same manner, it can be checked that <6′(n)= = <6(n)=
and <6′(r)= = v′4, which is enough to verify condition (3) in the de6nition of valid
substitution. Therefore, g is a secret permuter for the Client in our declassi6cation
protocol.
We have extended secret permuters over transition labels and contexts. Stores and
commands can equally be permuted. The extension of a secret permuter g over a store
is given by the equation g(0)(x)= g(0(x)). For a command c, de6ne g(c) to preserve
the structure of the command, down to the level of single annotated values which are
permuted according to g. For example, g(r := dec(b : get DCL; b′ : key DCL))= r :=
dec(b : get DCL; g(b′ : key DCL)). Commands like these occur naturally during the
course of expression evaluation, which is governed by a small-step semantics.
The idea now is to compare the behaviour of a given command on a given store and
context with its behaviour where secrets are permuted internally and then restored to
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their original values at the external interface, i.e. at the level of actions. For this pur-
pose we introduce a new construct at the command level, perturbation c[g], somewhat
reminiscent of the CCS relabelling operator, with the following transition semantics:
〈c; 0; s〉 2−→ 〈c′; 0′; s′〉
〈c[g]; 0; s〉 <g(s;2)=−−−→ 〈c′[g]; 0′; s′〉
; (7)
where <v hw== v h <w=, and g(s; 2) permutes 2 only if it is an admissible in-
vocation (i.e. g(s; 2)= g(2), if P; s 
 2 ok; and g(s; 2)= 2, otherwise). So a perturbed
command is executed by applying the secret permuter at the external interface, and
forgetting annotations. The latter point is important since the annotations describe data
8ow properties internal to the command at hand; the externally observable behaviour
should depend only on the functions invoked at the interface, and the values provided
to these functions as arguments.
Note the use of g(s; 2) in (7). The e=ect of this condition is that actions are only
a=ected by the permuter when they are “ok”. Secret input actions are generally always
“ok”, and so in general cause the internal choice of secret to be permuted. Output
actions that are not “ok”, however, are not a=ected by g(s; 2), and so in this case a
mismatch between value input and output may arise.
Thus, if the behaviour of a command is supposed to be invariant under perturbation,
the e=ect is that it must appear to the external world to behave the same whether or
not a secret permuter is applied to the internal values. This is re8ected in the following
de6nition.
De nition 14 (Admissibility). A command c∈Com is admissible for the store 0 and
context s, the dependency speci6cation P, if for all secret permuters g for P:
〈c[I ]; 0; s〉 ∼ 〈g(c)[g−1]; g(0); g(s)〉; (8)
where I is the identity secret permuter and ∼ is the standard Park–Milner strong
bisimulation equivalence.
Observe that the e=ect of perturbing a command with the identity secret permuter is
just to erase annotations at the interface, but keeping all values intact.
Example 15. Recall the de6nition of secret permuter g for the Declassi6er’s Client
in Example 13. If we modi6ed only slightly our assumptions so that 2(v′4)= xcpt
and 1(v4) =∈{YES; xcpt}, we could de6ne a secret permuter g′ just as we did with g.
This means that the dependency speci6cation of Example 5 expects the behaviour of
a Client implementation to be invariant under, among other permuters, g′. This is not
true of the implementation shown in Fig. 3. There is one possible trace where control
branches from line 9 to line 11 (if <0(resp)== v4) and another where it branches to
line 12 (if <0(resp)== v′4). In other words, the occurrence of an exception in executing
line 9 may leak inadmissible information about the relation between resp and secret.
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If this information were considered innocuous, we could simply add one more rule to
the dependency speci6cation:
∗ ← s get SECRET; r dec(m; k)
when 1(r) = xcpt ∨ 2(r) = xcpt; (9)
where ∗ represents some arbitrary h e where e does not mention any variable on the
right-hand side of the rule. Its purpose is not to declare admissible certain invocations of
the function h (h can always be invoked with non-sensitive arguments) but to introduce
a constraint on the set of secret permuters. Observe that, in the presence of rule (9),
g′ is no longer a valid secret permuter for the extended dependency speci6cation.
7. Local veri cation conditions
Applying the de6nition of admissibility out of the box can be quite arduous, since it
is tantamount to searching for, and checking, a bisimulation relation for each possible
secret permuter. In case the control 8ow is not a=ected by the choice of secrets one
may hope to be able to do better, since only data-related properties need to be checked.
In this section we give such a local condition.
De nition 16 (Stability for commands). Let a dependency speci6cation P be given.
Let 4 be the smallest re8exive and transitive relation over commands such that
c0 4 c0; c1 and c0 4 try c0 catch c1, for all commands c0 and c1. The command
c∈Com is stable if for all c′ 4 c and for all secret permuters g:
(1) if c′= if + then c2 else c3, then <+== <g(+)=, and
(2) if c′= r[.] and w∈ aVal is a subterm of ., then <w== xcpt i= <g(w)== xcpt,
where r[·] ::= x := · | if · then c0 else c1.
For stable commands we obtain strong properties concerning the way secret per-
muters can a=ect the state space.
Lemma 17. Suppose that c∈Com is stable w.r.t. dependency speci1cation P. Then,
〈c; 0; s〉 2−→〈c′; 0′; s′〉 i< 〈g(c); g(0); g(s)〉 g(2)−−→〈g(c′); g(0′); g(s′)〉.
De nition 18 (Stability for con6gurations). Let a dependency speci6cation be given.
The con6guration 〈c; 0; s〉 is stable if whenever 〈c; 0; s〉⇒ 〈c′; 0′; s′〉, then c′ is a
stable command.
Theorem 19. If c∈Com is ;ow compatible with dependency speci1cation P for store
0 and context s, and 〈c; 0; s〉 is stable, then c is admissible ( for 0, s, P and ∼).
Theorem 19 does not provide necessary conditions. In fact, there are admissible
programs whose control 8ow is a=ected by the perturbations. However, the import of
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Theorem 19 is that, in order to verify Admissibility it is su>cient to check that the
8ow of control is not a=ected by the relabelling of secret inputs and of admissible
outputs. Furthermore, it su>ces to check this for a (smaller) subset of the reachable
con6gurations.
To formalise this, consider a dependency speci6cation P and an initial con6guration
〈c0; 00; s0〉. For each con6guration 〈c; 0; s〉 de6ne g(〈c; 0; s〉) as the con6guration
that results from applying g to all three components, i.e. g(〈c; 0; s〉)= 〈g(c); g(0);
g(s)〉. Then assume the existence of a set of program con6gurations {8i}i∈I where
0∈I⊆N , which satis6es the following properties:
(P1) 80 = 〈c0; 00; s0〉,
(P2) for all i∈I, if 8i = 〈c; 0; s〉 then c is a stable command,
(P3) for all i∈I and for all actions 2 such that 8i 2−→ q, then
• q= g(8j), for some j∈I and some secret permuter g for P, and
• P; s 
 2 ok, if 8i = 〈c; 0; s〉.
Under these conditions, we obtain our main veri6cation result with the aid of
Lemma 17 and Theorem 19:
Theorem 20. Let P be a dependency speci1cation and 〈c0; 00; s0〉 an initial con1gura-
tion. If there is a set of con1gurations {8i}I satisfying P1–P3, then c0 is admissible
( for 00, s0, P and ∼).
8. Admissibility vs. -ow compatibility
In general, admissibility does not imply 8ow compatibility. At a 6rst glance this may
seem somewhat surprising. The point, however, is that 8ow compatibility provides
a syntactical tracing of data 8ow, not a semantical one. Consider for instance the
command
SECRET := get a1;
if SECRET = 0 then := send(SECRET; a2) else := send(0; a2)
in the context of a dependency speci6cation P= 〈{get a1}; ∅〉.
This command is clearly admissible for P (for any store and context), but not 8ow
compatible for quite obvious reasons. However, if the control 8ow does not permit
branching on secrets, we can show that in fact 8ow compatibility is implied. For this
purpose some additional assumptions need to be made concerning the domains and
functions involved.
Clearly, if constant primitive functions are allowed there are trivial examples of direct
8ows which violate 8ow compatibility without necessarily violating admissibility.
However, we are able to establish the following result as a partial converse to
Theorem 19.
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Lemma 21. Suppose 〈c0; 00; s0〉 is stable and admissible for dependency speci1cation
P. Then for all behaviours
〈c0; 00; s0〉 ⇒ 〈c1; 01; s1〉 v h w−−−−−→ 〈c2; 02; s2〉
of minimal length such that P; s1 
 v hw ok, the set
{<g(w)= | g is a secret permuter}
is 1nite.
Thus, if we can guarantee in6nite variability of the set in Lemma 21 (which we
cannot in general), 8ow compatibility does indeed follow from admissibility and sta-
bility.
9. Discussion and conclusions
We have studied and presented conditions under which an implementation is guaran-
teed to preserve the con6dentiality properties of a protocol. We 6rst determine, using
annotations, the direct 8ow properties. If all direct dependencies are admitted by the
policy, we use an extension of the admissibility condition introduced 6rst in [4] to
detect the presence of any other dependencies. If none are detected we conclude that
the implementation preserves the con6dentiality properties of the protocol.
As our main results we establish close relations between the direct and the indirect
dependency analysis in the case of programs which mirror the “only-high-branching-on-
secrets” condition familiar from type-based information 8ow analyses (cf. [13,11]). In
fact, in our setting the condition is more precisely cast as “only-permitted-branching-on-
secrets”, since branching on secrets is admissible as long as its “observational content”
is allowed by the dependency rules. The correspondence between the direct and the
indirect dependency analysis provides an “unwinding theorem” which can be exploited
to reduce a behavioural check (in our case: strong bisimulation equivalence) to an
invariant.
The notion of admissibility has relations to representation independence. The latter
concerns the problem of showing, for a given program, that its behaviour depends
only on abstract values, not on details concerning their concrete representation. This
is typically handled using logical relations (cf. [7]). The task is to give a relation that
describes how di=erent concrete representations implement the same abstraction, and
to show that if all methods preserve this relation then it will be preserved by any
client program. If one can show that, along a suitably de6ned external interface, the
relation is the identity, then one can conclude that no client program which respects this
interface can leak representation dependent information. The analogy with e.g. the PER
model of Sabelfeld and Sands [11] is clear, except that, in the case of representation
independence, 6ner variability at base types is required. On the other hand, variability
across the external interface is prohibited (or, in the case of data re6nement [8], required
to preserve the implementation ordering), and one can in fact view the present paper
as o=ering one scenario, and possible approach, for lifting this restriction.
P. Giambiagi, M. Dam / Science of Computer Programming 50 (2004) 73–99 91
One of the main goals of our work is to arrive at information 8ow analyses which
can control dependencies in a secure way, rather than prevent them altogether, since
this latter property excludes too many useful programs. Other attempts in this direc-
tion involve the modelling of observers as resource-bounded processes following well-
established techniques in Cryptography (cf. [12,6]). The scope of approaches such as
these remains very limited, however.
Intransitive non-interference [9] is a generalisation of non-interference that admits
downgrading through a trusted downgrader. Although it prevents direct downgrading
(i.e. 8ows around the downgrader), it does not prevent Trojan Horses from exploit-
ing legal downgrading channels to actively leak secret information. A solution is to
resort to Robust Declassi6cation [14], which provides criteria to determine whether a
downgrader may be exploited by an attacker. Unfortunately, this technique considers
attackers whose observation power turns out to be too strong in the presence of cryp-
tographic functions, so that the approach cannot be applied without major changes to
our examples.
Dependency speci6cations are abstract in the sense that they do not request compli-
ance with many functional properties of the security protocol. For example, the Client
speci6cation (Example 5) does not prevent an implementation from submitting the
same secret, over and over, to the Declassi6er. This is quite safe, as we assure that
aspects like the number of retransmissions, or their timing properties, cannot be used
to create covert channels.
However, there are occasions in which compliance with functional behaviour is crit-
ical. In particular, one important property which our approach does not handle satisfac-
torily is nonce freshness. Our formalism has, as yet, no way (except by the introduction
of arti6cial data dependencies) of expressing constraints such as “x was input after y”,
and thus we must at present resort to external means for this check.
One worry of more practical concern is the amount of detail needed to be provided
by the dependency rules. It is quite possible that this problem can be managed in
restricted contexts such as JavaCard. In general, though, it is not a priori clear how to
ensure that the rules provide enough implementation freedom, nor that they are in fact
correct. It may be that the rules can be produced automatically from abstract protocol
and API speci6cations, or, alternatively, that they can be synthesised from the given
implementation and then serve as input for a manual correctness check.
Appendix A. Proofs
Lemma 9. If g(v hw)= v′ hw′ then g(s[v=h w])= g(s)[v′=h w′].
Proof. Observe that w′= g(w) and pick any h1 w1 ∈Ann. Assume 6rst h1 w1 = hw′.
We compute
g(s[v=h w])(hw′) = g(s[v=h w])(h g(w))
= v′ (by (6))
= g(s)[v′=h w′](hw′):
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In case h1 w1 = hw′, let v′′, s[v=h w](h1 g−1(w1))= s(h1 g−1(w1)). We obtain
g(s[v=h w])(h1 w1) = <g(v′′ : h1 g−1(w1))=
= g(s)(h1 w1)
= g(s)[v′=h w′](h1 w1):
Lemma 11. Let g be a secret permuter. Then:
(1) g−1(g(s))= s,
(2) g−1 is a secret permuter, and
(3) if P; s 
 2 ok then P; g(s) 
 g(2) ok.
Proof. (1) Note 6rst that (6) is equivalent to
g(s)(fw) : fw = g( s(f g−1(w)) : f g−1(w) ): (A.1)
Given fw∈Ann, let w′, g(w). Then
g−1(g(s))(fw) : fw = g−1( g(s)(fw′) : fw′ ) (by (A:1))
= g−1( g(s(fw) : fw) ) (by (A:1))
= s(fw) : fw:
Therefore, g−1(g(s))(fw)= s(fw) for all fw∈Ann.
(2) This is a simple check, using that g, when extended over contexts, is a bijection
(a consequence of item (1)).
(3) Let P= 〈H;A〉. Assume 2= v hw where w has (at least) an annotation inH
(all other cases are trivial). Since P; s 
 2 ok, there must be a rule h e ← x1 h1 e1; : : : ;
xn hn en when  in A and a valid substitution 6 for this rule such that e6=w
(De6nition 4).
By De6nition 10.2, 6′(x), g(6(x)) is also a valid substitution for the rule above.
Assume g(v : hw)= v′ : hw′. It then only remains to notice that, by induction on the
structure of e, e6′= g(e6)=w′ and therefore P; g(s) 
 g(2) ok.
Corollary A.1. Let g be a secret permuter for dependency speci1cation P. If P; s 

2 ok then g−1(g(s); g(2))= 2.
Proof.
g−1(g(s); g(2)) = g−1(g(2)) (by Lemma 11:3; P; g(s) 
 g(2) ok)
= 2:
Proposition 12 (Composition of secret permuters). Given a dependency speci1cation,
the set of secret permuters is closed under functional composition.
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Proof. Let g and g′ be two secret permuters. We need to prove that t = g ◦ g′ is a secret
permuter too (where g ◦ g′(x), g(g′(x))). That t is a value permutation (De6nition 8)
is straightforward. It is also immediate that t satis6es (10.3).
The key observation needed to check that t satis6es (10.1) is that if fw contains
no annotation in H then neither does f g′(w). This is so because w cannot have an
annotation in H and, since g′ is a secret permuter, g′(w)=w (also by (10.1)).
Finally, for condition (10.2) it is enough to check that t(s) = g(g′(s)) (observe
that here t is a function over contexts, so the equality is not immediate from the
de6nition of t as a function over annotated values). Given fw∈Ann, let w′, g−1(w)
and w′′= g′−1(w′)= t−1(w). Then
g(g′(s))(fw) : fw = g( g′(s)(fw′) : fw′ ) (by (A:1))
= g( g′(s(fw′′) : fw′′) ) (by (A:1))
= t(s(f t−1(w)) : f t−1(w))
= t(s)(fw) : fw (by (A:1)):
Therefore, t(s)(fw)= g(g′(s))(fw) for all fw∈Ann.
Remark A.2. For a 6xed dependency speci6cation, if c′ ∈Com is stable and c4 c′,
then c is stable.
Lemma A.3. Let a dependency speci1cation be given. Then, for all secret permuters
g, c∈Com is stable i< g(c) is stable.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 11.2 and Proposition 12.
Lemma A.4. Suppose that r[.0] is a stable command and . is a subterm of .0. If
0 
 . 2−→ .′ then g(0)
 g(.) g(2)−−→ g(.′).
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the structure of derivations of 0 
 . 2−→ .′.
• Case .= x:
Since .′= 0(x), 2= 1, g(x)= x, and g(0)
 x 1−→ g(0)(x), it is immediate that g(0)

g(x)
g(2)−−→ g(0(x)).
• Case . = (: : : ; .1; : : :) and 0 
 .1 2−→ .′1:
From the annotated semantics for expression evaluation (Table 1)
0 
 (: : : ; .1; : : :) 2−→ (: : : ; .′1; : : :):
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Using that .1 is a subterm of .0, by the inductive hypothesis, g(0)
 g(.1) g(2)−−→ g(.′1).
Since g(: : : ; :; : : :)= (: : : ; g(:); : : :), we conclude that
g(0) 
 g(: : : ; .1; : : :) g(2)−−→ g(: : : ; .′1; : : :):
• Case .=(: : : ; w; : : :) with <w= = xcpt:
According to the semantics in Table 1, .′=w and 2= 1. Since w is a subterm of
.0, by De6nition 16.2, <g(w)== xcpt. We can then infer that
g(0) 
 (: : : ; g(w); : : :) g(2)−−→ g(w):
• Case .=f .1 and 0 
 .1 2−→ .′1:
Since .1 is a subterm of .0, by the inductive hypothesis, g(0)
 g(.1) g(2)−−→ g(.′1). Note
that g(f .1)=f g(.1). It is then immediate that
g(0) 
 g(f .1) g(2)−−→ g(f .′1):
• Case .= pf w with pf (<w=)= v:
From Table 1, .′= v : pf w and 2= 1. Moreover, g(.)= pf g(w) and g(2)= 1. If
g(v : pf w)= v′ : pf g(w), then pf (<g(w)=)= v′ (by De6nition 8.4), so that
g(0) 
 pf g(w) 1−→ v′ : pf g(w):
• Case .= hw:
From Table 1, .′= v : hw and 2= v hw. Moreover, g(.)= h g(w). Let g(v : hw)=
v′ : h g(w). Then g(.′)= v′ : h g(w) and
g(0) 
 h g(w) v
′ h g(w)−−−−−−−→ v′ : h g(w):
Lemma 17. Suppose that c∈Com is stable w.r.t. dependency speci1cation P. Then,
〈c; 0; s〉 2−→〈c′; 0′; s′〉 i< 〈g(c); g(0); g(s)〉 g(2)−−→〈g(c′); g(0′); g(s′)〉.
Proof. Note 6rst that, because of Lemmas A.3 and 11, only one implication needs
to be shown. The proof proceeds by induction on the structure of the derivation of
〈c; 0; s〉 2−→〈c′; 0′; s′〉.
• Case c= skip:
In this case, c′= ∗, 0= 0′, s= s′ and 2= 1. Then
〈g(c) = skip; g(0); g(s)〉 1=g(2)−−−→ 〈g(c′); g(0′); g(s′)〉:
P. Giambiagi, M. Dam / Science of Computer Programming 50 (2004) 73–99 95
• Case c= x := +:
Here, c′= ∗, 0′= 0[+=x], s′= s, and 2= 1. Then
〈g(c); g(0); g(s)〉
‖
〈x := g(+); g(0); g(s)〉 1 = g(2)−−−−−−→ 〈∗; g(0)[g(+)=x]; g(s)〉
‖
〈g(c′); g(0′); g(s′)〉:
• Cases c= c0; c1 (where c0 = ∗) and c= try c0 catch c1 (where c0 = throw):
Note that c0 4 c and therefore, by Remark A.2, c0 is stable.
The derivation of 〈c; 0; s〉 2−→〈c′; 0′; s′〉 has, respectively, the forms
〈c0; 0; s〉 2−→ 〈c′0; 0′; s′〉
〈c; 0; s〉 2−→ 〈c′0; c1; 0′; s′〉
〈c0; 0; s〉 2−→ 〈c′0; 0′; s′〉
〈c; 0; s〉 2−→ 〈try c′0 catch c1; 0′; s′〉
:
By the inductive hypothesis, 〈g(c0); g(0); g(s)〉 g(2)−−→〈g(c′0); g(0′); g(s′)〉. The re-
sult follows from g(c0; c1)= g(c0); g(c1), and g(try c0 catch c1)= try g(c0) catch
g(c1).
• Case c= if + then c0 else c1:
We only consider the case when <+== true. The case when <+= = true is completely
analogous.
From the only semantics rule applicable in this case, 2= 1, c′= c0, 0′= 0, and s′= s.
Moreover, g(c)= if g(+) then g(c0) else g(c1). Since c is stable, by De6nition 16.1,
<g(+)== true. Finally, using the semantics rule for the if command
〈if g(+) then g(c0) else g(c1); g(0); g(s)〉 1−→ 〈g(c0); g(0); g(s)〉:
• Case c=while . do c0 end:
In this case, c′= if . then c0; c else skip, 2= 1, 0′= 0 and s′= s. Since g(c)=
while g(.) do g(c0) end and g(c′)= if g(.) then g(c0);g(c) else skip, the result
follows trivially.
• Case c= try throw catch c1:
Note that 2= 1, c′= c1, 0′= 0, s′= s. The result follows trivially from g(c)=
try throw catch g(c1).
• Case c= r[.] and 0 
 . 2−→ .′:
Here, c′= r[.′], 0′= 0, and s′ =
{
s if 2= 1;
s[v=h w] if 2=(v hw):
By Lemma A.4, g(0)
 g(.) g(2)−−→ g(.′). We can then derive
〈g(r)[g(.)]; g(0); g(s)〉 g(2)−−→ 〈g(r)[g(.′)]; g(0); s′′〉;
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where we have extended the permutation of commands over reduction contexts (so
that g(r)[·] is like r[·] only that annotated values have been permuted according to
g) and
s′′ =
{
g(s) if g(2) = 1;
g(s)[v′=h w′] if g(2) = (v′ hw′)
=
{
g(s) if 2 = 1;
g(s[v=h w]) if 2 = (v hw) (by Lemma 9)
= g(s′):
Note 6nally that g(r)[g(.′)]= g(r[.′])= g(c′), and g(0)= g(0′).
• Case c= r[w], where <w== xcpt:
We know that 〈r[w]; 0; s〉 1−→〈throw; 0; s〉. Since c is stable, <gw= = xcpt (by
De6nition 16.2). This and g(r[w]) = g(r)[g(w)] imply that
〈g(r[w]); g(0); g(s)〉 1−→ 〈throw; g(0); g(s)〉:
Theorem 19. If c∈Com is ;ow compatible with dependency speci1cation P for store
0 and context s, and 〈c; 0; s〉 is stable, then c is admissible ( for 0, s, P and ∼).
Proof. Let g be an arbitrary secret permuter for P, and de6ne
R,{ (〈c1[I ]; 01; s1〉; 〈g(c1)[g−1]; g(01); g(s1)〉) |〈c; 0; s〉 ⇒ 〈c1; 01; s1〉 }:
Suppose that 〈c1[I ]; 01; s1〉 R 〈g(c1)[g−1]; g(01); g(s1)〉, and suppose 6rst that
〈c1[I ]; 01; s1〉 ;−→ 〈c′; 02; s2〉:
From the semantic de6nition of the relabelling operator (7), there must exist 2 and c2
such that ;= <I(s1; 2)== <2=, c′ = c2[I ] and
〈c1; 01; s1〉 2−→ 〈c2; 02; s2〉: (A.2)
Since c1 is a stable command (because 〈c; 0; s〉 is stable and c1 is reachable from
〈c; 0; s〉 by de6nition of R), Lemma 17 can be applied to Eq. (A.2) to yield
〈g(c1); g(01); g(s1)〉 g(2)−−→ 〈g(c2); g(02); g(s2)〉: (A.3)
By 8ow compatibility P; s1 
 2 ok. Then g−1(g(s1); g(2))= 2 (Corollary A.1). From
Eq. (7),
〈g(c1)[g−1]; g(01); g(s1)〉 ;−→ 〈g(c2)[g−1]; g(02); g(s2)〉
and 〈c2[I ]; 02; s2〉 R 〈g(c2)[g−1]; g(02); g(s2)〉.
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Suppose now that 〈g(c1)[g−1]; g(01); g(s1)〉 ;−→〈c′; 0′; s′〉. There must exist c2,
02, s2 and 2 such that Eq. (A.3) holds, together with ; = <g−1(g(s1); g(2))=, c′ =
g(c2)[g−1], 0′ = g(02) and s′ = g(s2). Eq. (A.2) follows from Lemma 17, and the
result is then obtained like in the previously analysed case.
Lemma A.5. Consider a set {8i}i∈I satisfying conditions P1–P3. Then, for each con-
1guration 8= 〈c; 0; s〉 that is reachable from 80, there is an i∈I and a secret
permuter g such that 8= g(8i).
Proof. By induction on the length of the shortest path from 80 to 8. If the path
has length zero, take i=0 and g= I . Otherwise, let 8′ be on the path such that
8′
2−→ 8. By the inductive hypothesis, there must exist j∈I and a permuter g such
that g(8j)= 8′, with 8j = 〈c′; 0′; s′〉. By P2, c′ is a stable command. We know
that g(c′) is also stable (by Lemma A.3); thus g−1(8′)
g−1(2)−−−→ g−1(8) (Lemma 17).
Note that g−1(8′)= g−1(g(8j)) = 8j. Using P3, choose i∈I and permuter g′ so that
g−1(8)= g′(8i). Then, 8=(g ◦ g′)(8i), and the result follows from Proposition 12.
Theorem 20. Let P be a dependency speci1cation and 〈c0; 00; s0〉 an initial con1gura-
tion. If there is a set of con1gurations {8i}I satisfying P1–P3, then c0 is admissible
( for 00, s0, P and ∼).
Proof. By Theorem 19, it su>ces to show that 80 is both stable and 8ow compatible.
Assume 80⇒∗ 8= 〈c; 0; s〉. By Lemma A.5, 8= g(8i) where 8i = 〈c′; 0′; s′〉 for some
i∈I and some secret permuter g:
• Stability—By P2, c′ is stable. Since c= g(c′), c is stable (Lemma A.3).
• Flow compatibility—If 8 2−→ q, then 8i g
−1(2)−−−→ g−1(q) (Lemma 17). By P3, P; s′ 

g−1(2) ok. That is, P; s 
 2 ok (Lemma 11.3).
Lemma A.6. For all c, 0, s, 2, the sets
<2(〈c; 0; s〉) = {〈c′; 0′; s′〉 | 〈c; 0; s〉 2−→ 〈c′; 0′; s′〉};
Acts(〈c; 0; s〉) = {hw | ∃c′; 0′; s′; v: 〈c; 0; s〉 v h w−−−−−→ 〈c′; 0′; s′〉}
are 1nite.
Lemma 21. Suppose 〈c0; 00; s0〉 is stable and admissible for dependency speci1cation
P. Then for all behaviours
〈c0; 00; s0〉 ⇒ 〈c1; 01; s1〉 v h w−−−−−→ 〈c′1; 0′1; s′1〉
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of minimal length such that P; s1 
 v hw ok, the set
{<g(w)= | g is a secret permuter}
is 1nite.
Proof. Say
〈c′; 0′; s′〉 =⇒ 〈c′′; 0′′; s′′〉
i=
〈c′; 0′; s′〉 = 〈c′0; 0′0; s′0〉
21−→ · · · 2n−→ 〈c′n; 0′n; s′n〉 = 〈c′′; 0′′; s′′〉
and = is the sequence 21; : : : ; 2n. De6ne <== as the sequence <21=; : : : ; <2n=, and g(=)
as the sequence g(21); : : : ; g(2n). Let
<=(〈c; 0; s〉) = {〈c′; 0′; s′〉 | 〈c; 0; s〉 =⇒ 〈c′; 0′; s′〉}:
It follows from Lemma A.6 that <=(〈c; 0; s〉) and <<==(〈c[I ]; 0; s〉) are 6nite.
Take any = of minimal length such that
〈c0; 00; s0〉 =⇒ 〈c1; 01; s1〉 2−→ 〈c′1; 0′1; s′1〉 (A.4)
and P; s1 
 2 ok. Note that, by requiring the length of = to be minimal, it is guaranteed
that every action in = is admissible at its corresponding context in (A.4).
Let now g be any secret permuter. Given that 〈c0; 00; s0〉 is stable, it follows from
Lemma 17 that
〈g(c0); g(00); g(s0)〉 g(=)⇒ 〈g(c1); g(01); g(s1)〉
g(2)−−→ 〈g(c′1); g(0′1); g(s′1)〉: (A.5)
Then, by Lemma 11, every action in g(=) is admissible at its corresponding context
in (A.5) and P; g(s1) 
 g(2) ok. By the de6nition of [g−1] and Corollary A.1,
〈g(c0)[g−1]; g(00); g(s0)〉 <==⇒ 〈g(c1)[g−1]; g(01); g(s1)〉
<g(2)=−−−→ 〈g(c′1)[g−1]; g(0′1); g(s′1)〉:
By admissibility,
〈c0[I ]; 00; s0〉 <==⇒ 〈c2[I ]; 02; s2〉 <g(2)=−−−→ 〈c′2[I ]; 0′2; s′2〉: (A.6)
W.l.o.g. assume 2= v hw. Then <g(2)== <v′ h g(w)== v′ h <g(w)= for some
value v′, and therefore (A.6) shows that, for each secret permuter g,
h <g(w)= ∈
⋃
〈c2[I ]; 02 ; s2〉∈<<==(〈c0[I ]; 00 ; s0〉)
Acts(〈c2[I ]; 02; s2〉):
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The set on the right is a 6nite union of 6nite sets, by Lemma A.6. Therefore, there is
only a 6nite number of distinct <g(w)=.
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